Unreasonable Rationality
While they are commonly used interchangeably, one of the more useful conceptual distinctions I’ve made is between “reasonableness” and “rationality”.
The main difference I make between the two is the degree of dependance on public perception.
“Reasonable” is a social descriptor–a person appears reasonable to others. To be reasonable, therefore, is to be legible–you must be able to make yourself understood. But legibility requires a whole host of other things too, for example: shared knowledge, assumptions, and even values. A person who grows up in an isolated religious context and does not know basic science might not find a reference to the theory of evolution all that reasonable, and they are not wrong to feel that way. If a society is made up of such people, then Darwin is, by definition, unreasonable.
Rationality, however, has no such requirements. Rationality is independent of human perception–Galileo was not “reasonable” in his time, but he was rational in all times. (However, it is important to understand that while rationality may have a greater claim to approaching truth, a rational argument can be wrong if the presumptions are wrong—some scientists who initially opposed Galileo can also claim to be rational. We needed a new physics, after all.)
The point I want to make with this distinction is that what is rational quite often sounds unreasonable.
A rational argument can easily look crazy if “fashion” pulls powerfully against it (the lab leak hypothesis is my favorite example of this), or if it runs against a valued social norm. A rational person can also look crazy to all the reasonable folk, if the degree of separation between the spheres of knowledge is far enough. This is one reason I recently argued that being a heavy reader is probably bad for one’s chances at running for political office–ideally, one should be just slightly better read than their audience or must compensate for their damning level of knowledge by also possessing extraordinary communication skills. (Obama is an example of the latter, both well read and excellent at making himself understood, while JD Vance might be a heavy reader who fails the communication test.)
But it isn’t just politicians walking the tight rope—the pressures to place the reasonable above the rational affect us all, including (and perhaps especially) “public intellectuals”.
While politicians can garner support through other means, reasonableness is the main capital of the public intellectual. They must always have large stores—stores that they accumulate by being only as rational as the demands of reasonableness will allow. However, when the two are in tension, it is career suicide for the public intellectual to choose the unreasonable-but-rational position. In such cases, it is often better to remain silent, or speak out only if one has amassed a great deal of social capital as a “reasonable voice”. Then, people are more likely to question their own assumptions, but it is still a risky act and must be rarely done.
This is one reason I argue intellectuals might be more likely than the public to defer acknowledging important but controversial truths—the cost to reasonableness may be too high.
This is why politicians and people clash. People with no public responsibilities have no problem
taking rational positions; there is not cost to them, as opposed to politicians, who can afford to
adhere to rationality and principles. This is an insoluble problem and a main reason for the sluggishness and compromises and sidelining of principles. It becomes dangerous when people adhere to ideology, religion, biases and peer group pressure, as witness what is going on today in this country. The problem/puzzle is how this can serve democracy and the rule of law. It is now
in the process of overturning these. And when rational democratic principles or a moral code are thrown out the window, anything goes. The prizing of anti democratic principles and structures over a rational and moral code that serves no one faction is what we face today.
Great piece, Sarah! I’ve been thinking a lot about how the concept of dynamic balance is distinct from pure opposition. I largely agree with your distinction between reasonableness / rationality, though I think reasonableness has become even more essential in today’s conspiracy addled internet. Reasonableness acts as a necessary guardrail to prevent rational arguments from being twisted into grossly misleading / harmful narratives. This really shows up in highly partisan environments, where reasonableness becomes subjective, filtered through tribal lenses. Figures like Yuval Noah Harari and Jordan Peterson often say things that are objectively reasonable, but their words are interpreted differently by ideologically diverse groups, each filtering the message through their own biases. Here, reasonableness, rather than being a simple social construct, acts as a buffer that helps ensure rationality doesn’t get hijacked. Conspiracy theories are often built on the union of two facts to create an untruth, and reason is one of the few mechanisms we have for unraveling this act.
Perhaps reasonableness and rationality aren’t mutually exclusive. Reasonableness does require social legibility, but it often incorporates rationality to varying degrees. Many smart people find ways to balance both, using rational thinking to shape their ideas while ensuring they’re presented in a way that’s understandable (if not always fully acceptable) to a wider audience. I may also be worth noting that reasonableness, when defined as legibility, may help prevent overly abstract thinking that alienates people. Public legibility forces intellectuals to engage with other perspectives and ensure their arguments aren’t built on niche, technical jargon.
This is why I have unbounded respect for individuals (like you!) who manage to build respect among audiences they frequently disappoint by undermining cherished narratives. It frees them to speak their mind without the need to pander, allowing for a more genuine pursuit of truth.